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Lewis: The U.S. Naval Institute on Naval Tactics, edited by Wayne P. Hug

China is, as Haddick agrees, achieving
its objectives without risking war. Beijing
understands there is a threshold for U.S.
military response and will continue to
operate below it. An American president
would be loath to fire the first shots over
the Chinese occupation of an uninhabited island. Haddick therefore argues the
United States should develop policies to
encourage China to follow the existing
international rules in letter and spirit.
Unfortunately, he does not detail these
policies, leaving his strategy wanting.
Haddick states that strategy is about
managing risk. While much of what
Haddick proposes seems commonsensical, it is unfinished, and this poses risks.
Focusing only on punitive measures
against possible Chinese actions runs
the risk of ignoring the ways China
has played by the rules while furthering a mind-set where every development in the PLA’s modernization is
perceived as a threat to U.S. regional
interests—regardless of Chinese intentions. This book should be read as part
of an ongoing and equally unfinished
debate on how to handle a rising China.
IAN T. SUNDSTROM

Hughes, Wayne P., ed. The U.S. Naval Institute
on Naval Tactics. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 2015. 192pp. $21.95

The U.S. Naval Institute on Naval Tactics
is a collection of thirteen essays assembled by Captain Wayne Hughes,
USN (Ret.)—author of several books,
most notably Fleet Tactics and Coastal
Combat and Military Modeling for Decision Making. Captain Hughes is also
an accomplished naval officer, having
served as commanding officer of USS
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Hummingbird (MSC 192) and USS
Morton (DD 948). Notable authors appearing in On Tactics include Admiral
Woodward, RN, who commanded
British forces in the Falklands War, and
Giuseppe Fioravanzo, Admiral of the
Fleet, Italian Navy. On Tactics is part
of the U.S. Naval Institute’s new Wheel
Books series, which is a collection of
books containing some of the Naval
Institute’s most well-regarded articles
from Proceedings—and other sources—
on such topics as naval leadership,
command, strategy, and cooperation.
On Tactics is well worth the reader’s
time, and appropriate for both junior
and senior officers. It benefits greatly
from Hughes’s insightful commentary
and tactful editing, which boils the combined length of the selected essays down
to a manageable 190 pages. Although the
topic of tactics is broadly applicable to
all naval communities, surface warfare
officers will probably have the easiest
time relating to the selected essays.
Of the thirteen essays in the volume, a
favorite was “Missile Chess: A Parable,”
written by Hughes himself. “Missile
Chess” describes a game created by
Hughes in which players sit down to play
a traditional game of chess but with a major twist: the players have a fixed number
of “missiles” that they must distribute
among their pieces as they see fit. The
pieces still move according to the rules of
regular chess, but each time they capture
an opposing piece they expend one “missile.” Once a piece’s missile inventory is
depleted a piece can still move but can no
longer capture. After he walks us through
several hypothetical scenarios, it is clear
that despite its simplicity, missile chess
nicely elucidates some of the most vexing operational challenges with which a
modern naval commander must contend.
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My only criticism of On Tactics is
that some of the selected essays veer
into areas that could more aptly be
described as “strategy” or “enterprise
management.” For example, “Toward
a New Identity” chronicles Admiral
Luce’s struggle to keep the Atlantic fleet
together long enough to test the tactical
doctrines flowing out of the recently
founded Naval War College. Although
this is a fine essay, it does not provide
the reader with any particular insight
into tactics. Rather, it provides insight
into why new tactics can be difficult to
develop. Similarly, “Creating ASW Killing Zones,” although an excellent piece
on Cold War antisubmarine warfare
operations and strategy, does not provide much in the way of tactical insights
on how to defeat the submarine threat.
The great advantage of this book, and
indeed the entire Wheel Books series, is
that it makes many excellent articles and
essays readily available to the reading
public—essays that might otherwise
have fallen by the wayside. Overall,
this volume is an excellent addition to
any personal library. The size of the
book and length of the articles make
it an excellent work for professional
development, wardroom discussion,
and thought-provoking conversation.
CHARLES H. LEWIS

Wachman, Alan M. Why Taiwan? Geostrategic
Rationales for China’s Territorial Integrity. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2007. 272pp.
$25.95

Tufts Fletcher School professor Alan
Wachman was a giant in the China, East
Asian studies, and international relations field who remains sorely missed
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following his untimely death in 2012.
In what is widely considered one of his
major scholarly contributions, through
this pithy, well-researched book—rightly
considered a classic—Wachman engages
in exceptional interdisciplinary analysis
to offer provocative coverage of historical episodes that have shaped Taiwan’s
status fundamentally. Some events raise
penetrating questions about what might
have resulted had they ended differently;
other factors inspire critical questions
about East Asia’s future. Wachman develops a theme of the strategic salience
of “imagined geography” as the best
explanation for the significant variation
over time in the association of Taiwan
as part of Chinese sovereign territory
in the minds of the leaders, and even
the populace, of mainland China. He
does so through close examination of
key Chinese documents and terminology as well as careful consideration of
their relative authority and reliability.
Wachman suggests that Sun Yat-sen,
Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, and even
possibly Deng Xiaoping did not initially
consider Taiwan to be part of China in
the sense that it is understood officially
today. This approach raises compelling
questions about state formation and
national identity that are critical to the
understanding of international relations.
Indeed, it may be argued that “imagined
geography” is a global phenomenon and
hardly peculiar to China. It is important
to remember that Taiwan was formally
incorporated into Qing administration
in 1683, nearly a century before the
founding of the United States. One may
contrast such historical events as the
American acquisition and incorporation of Hawaii and Alaska and conclude
that the factors Wachman considers do
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